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Influence and management of conflicts of interest in randomised 
clinical trials: qualitative interview study
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Mustafe H A Gelle,1 Lesley A Stewart,7 Isabelle Boutron,8 Asbjørn Hróbjartsson1,2,3
ABSTRACT
Objective
To characterise and analyse the experiences of trial 
researchers of if and how conflicts of interest had 
unduly influenced clinical trials they had worked 
on, what management strategies they had used 
to minimise any potential influence, and their 
experiences and views on conflicts of interest more 
generally.
Design
Qualitative interview study.
ParticiPants
Trial researchers who had participated in at least 
10 clinical trials with methodological or statistical 
expertise. Researchers difered by geographical 
location, educational background, and experience 
with diferent types of funders. Interviewees were 
identiied by searches on Web of Science and 
snowball sampling. 52 trial researchers were 
approached by email; 20 agreed to be interviewed.
setting
Interviews conducted by telephone, recorded, 
transcribed verbatim, imported to NVivo 12, 
and analysed by systematic text condensation. 
Semistructured interviews focused on inancial and 
non-inancial conflicts of interest.
results
The interviewees had participated in a median of 
37.5 trials and were mainly male physicians who had 
experience with commercial and non-commercial 
trial funders. Two predeined themes (influence of 
conflicts of interest and management strategies) 
and two additional themes (deinition and reporting 
of conflicts of interest) emerged. Examples of 
perceived influence of conflicts of interest were: 
choice of inferior comparator, manipulation of the 
randomisation process, prematurely stopping the 
trials, fabrication of data, blocking access to data, 
and spin (eg, overly favourable interpretation of the 
results). Examples of strategies to manage conflicts 
of interest were: disclosure procedures, exclusion of 
the funder from design and analysis, independent 
committees, contracts ensuring complete access to 
the data, and no restriction by the funder on analysis 
and reporting. Interviewees used diferent deinitions 
or thresholds for what they considered to be conflicts 
of interest, and they described diferent criteria for 
when to report them. Some interviewees considered 
non-commercial inancial conflicts of interest (eg, 
funding of trials by governmental health agencies with 
a political agenda) to be equally or more important 
than commercial inancial conflicts of interest (eg, 
funding by drug and device companies), but more 
challenging to report and manage.
cOnclusiOn
This study described how trial researchers perceive 
conflicts of interest unduly influencing clinical trials 
they had worked on, and the management strategies 
they used to prevent these influences. The results 
indicated considerable variability in researchers’ 
understanding of what conflicts of interest are and 
when they should be reported.
Introduction
Clinical trials are considered to be the most reliable 
method of evaluating the efect of healthcare 
interventions, but trials can be biased or might 
investigate a question of little clinical relevance.1  2 
Conlicts of interest can inluence how trials are 
designed, conducted, analysed, and reported,3 4 and 
journal editors routinely ask authors of trial reports 
(and authors of other study publications) to declare 
conlicts of interest and the role of the funder in the 
trial.5 6
Conlicts of interest are often deined as “a set of 
circumstances that creates a risk that professional 
judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will 
be unduly inluenced by a secondary interest.”6 The 
primary interest of researchers in a clinical trial should 
be to conduct a relevant and unbiased investigation. A 
conlict of interest is a risk of inluence by a secondary 
interest (eg, if a funder or a researcher involved in how 
For numbered ailiations see 
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Funding by a commercial source and authors’ inancial conflicts of interest are 
associated with statistically signiicant results and favourable trial conclusions 
being reported more frequently 
Concern that conflicts of interest might influence how trials are designed, 
conducted, analysed, and reported is widespread
The mechanisms linking undue influence of conflicts of interest on speciic 
design features or bias of trials, and management strategies to minimise the 
problems, are not fully understood
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
Our study described how trial researchers perceive conflicts of interest unduly 
influencing clinical trials that they had worked on and the management 
strategies they used to prevent these influences; detailed examples of perceived 
influence of conflicts of interest were provided
Considerable variability was found between trial researchers of what they 
considered to be conflicts of interest and when they should be reported
Financial conflicts of interest related to non-commercial funders (eg, 
governmental health agencies with a political agenda) were considered equally 
or more important than commercial inancial conflicts of interest (eg, drug and 
device companies), but more challenging to report and manage
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a trial is designed, conducted, or reported stands to 
gain inancially, depending on the published results of 
the trial).
To minimise undue inluence from conlicts of 
interest and facilitate impartiality, and to be seen as 
free from conlicts, trial planners might include various 
management strategies: employ an independent trial 
statistician, establish an independent data safety and 
monitoring board, or exclude people working for a 
commercial funder from direct involvement in the trial.
Funding by a commercial source (eg, a pharma­
ceutical or medical device company) and authors’ 
inancial conlicts of interest have been shown to be 
associated with statistically signiicant results and 
favourable trial conclusions being reported more 
frequently.3 7 Examples of academic trials with lawed 
results where non­inancial conlicts of interest might 
have a role also exist (eg, because of unduly strong 
ailiations to a specialty, to a scientiic theory, or to 
academic appearance).8­11
We are not aware of any empirical studies that 
have investigated the mechanisms linking undue 
inluence of conlicts of interest to biased trial results 
or to speciic trial design features, or studies on 
management strategies to minimise the problem. We 
wanted to explore the experiences and views of trial 
researchers on conlicts of interest because many of the 
known cases of lawed trials associated with conlicts 
of interest have been exposed by trial researchers.12 13
Therefore, we conducted a qualitative interview 
study of experienced trial researchers. Our main 
objectives were to characterise and analyse trial 
researchers’ experiences of inancial and non­inancial 
conlicts of interest, and if and how they had unduly 
inluenced clinical trials they had worked on. We also 
explored their experiences of management strategies 
that had been used to minimise the potential inluence 
of conlicts of interest, and their experiences and views 
more generally.
Methods
identiication of candidates
We identiied candidates by snowball and purposive 
sampling. In the initial screening process, we mainly 
used snowball sampling based on our personal 
networks and suggestions from interviewees. Our 
original plan was to search for candidates on Web of 
Science but this recruitment method was ineicient, 
and we shifted to snowball sampling, which identiied 
15 of the inal 20 interviewees included in the study 
(ig 1 in the appendix).
In the next step, we deliberately selected informa­
tion rich researchers. We deined information rich 
researchers by experience (10 trials or more) and 
author role (trial researchers with methodological 
and statistical expertise). The experience criterion 
facilitated saturation by focusing on individuals who 
were more likely to have experienced the inluence 
of conlicts of interest in trials. The author role 
criterion allowed us to include interviewees with 
more knowledge of conlicts of interest and trial 
methodology, and perhaps more likely to have seen 
and remembered the issues we wanted to explore. We 
also wanted diversity in geography and professional 
background, and experience with diferent types of 
funders; these factors were deined a priori based on 
our knowledge of trial methodology and conlicts of 
interest, and on previous research.3 14­16 These criteria 
were used consistently throughout the study.
We sent email invitations to candidates describing 
our study and providing the option to access our 
protocol (appendix). We sent one reminder if candi­
dates did not reply. We did not set a time limit on 
responding to the emails. We stopped inclusion of new 
interviewees at the point of saturation—that is, when 
an informal preliminary assessment of the interviews 
showed no new major themes, evaluated each time ive 
new interviews had been conducted.17
interview procedures and content
Semistructured interviews18 were conducted by 
telephone with an interview guide (ig 2 in the 
appendix). The interview guide was developed based 
on previous research,19 20 our knowledge of the 
specialty, and suggestions by the interviewees from a 
pilot test. The pilot test involved three trial researchers 
(not included in our sample) and resulted in minor 
adjustments (adding one question on declaration of 
conlicts of interest). We conducted the interviews 
by telephone because we wanted to include trial 
researchers from diferent countries and continents. 
Telephone interviews are also suitable when dealing 
with topics that might be regarded as socially 
sensitive.21 22
The interviewer was guided by open ended 
questions structured around the trial researchers’ 
experiences with: trial collaborators with conlicts of 
interest; undue inluence of conlicts of interest on the 
design, conduct, analysis, and reporting of trials; and 
management of the undue inluence. If the answers to 
the questions were brief, we used speciic prompts from 
the interview guide to help the interviewees elaborate 
on examples and thoughts (ig 2 in the appendix). The 
interviewer made notes of the examples and comments 
of the trial researchers to help further elaboration. We 
emphasised that we were interested in their personal 
experiences of trials they had worked on. Also, we 
asked the interviewees about their educational back­
ground and general trial experience.
We informed the interviewees that all information 
would be handled conidentially and published in 
an anonymous format. The interviewees consented 
to audio recorded interviews that two of the authors 
(SA and MHAG) transcribed verbatim. We shared 
the transcript of our indings with one interviewee 
who asked to read them to ensure that they were not 
recognisable.
the interviewer
The interviewer (LØ) has a master’s degree in physical 
therapy and was working as a research assistant and 
research librarian at the time of the interviews. He had 
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formal training in qualitative research and interview 
techniques but was not experienced in conducting 
qualitative research and had no strong beliefs about 
the topic of the interviews. He briely introduced 
himself to the interviewees but gave no further details 
on his background unless asked during the interview.
analysis and reporting
We analysed the interview transcriptions with 
systematic text condensation for thematic cross case 
analysis.23 This analysis was a four step procedure: (1) 
all transcribed interviews were read for an overview 
of the data; (2) meaning units were identiied in 
the texts, representing diferent aspects of the trial 
researchers’ experiences of conlicts of interest in 
clinical trials, followed by coding into groups; (3) to 
clarify diferent aspects in the code groups, subgroups 
were created, from which condensates were produced, 
and illustrative quotations were identiied; and (4) 
trial researchers’ experiences with conlicts of interest 
based on the condensates were described. Two of the 
authors (LØ and AL) conducted the irst step; the other 
three steps were conducted by the irst author (LØ). 
Figure 3 in the appendix shows the coding tree. We 
used the software NVivo 12 (Alfasoft) for the analysis. 
In response to peer review comments, we conducted 
a secondary analysis of the transcripts focusing on 
potential diferences in interview responses between 
men and women. We used the COREQ (consolidated 
criteria for reporting qualitative research) checklist for 
reporting qualitative research.24
Patient and public involvement
We did not engage patients or the public in our study 
because our focus was on research methodology and 
trial researchers.
Results
We emailed 52 interview candidates of whom 27 did 
not respond, ive declined to participate (two did not 
have time to participate and three gave no reason), and 
20 (38%) agreed to be interviewed. The 20 interviews 
were conducted from December 2017 to July 2018 
and lasted a median of 24 minutes (range 15­58). 
The characteristics of the interviewees are reported in 
table 1 and the characteristics of the non­respondents 
are reported in table 1 in the appendix. In addition 
to the two predeined themes (inluence of conlicts 
of interest on trials and management strategies), we 
found two more themes: deinition and reporting of 
conlicts of interest.
theme 1: influence of conflicts of interest on trials
Eight of the 20 interviewees had been involved in trials 
where they believed someone had tried to inluence the 
trial because of conlicts of interest. The interviewees 
gave various examples of undue inluence for inancial 
and non­inancial conlicts of interest. Table 2 describes 
all the perceived mechanisms of inluence (with 
illustrative quotes) as a result of conlicts of interest 
experienced by the interviewees. We divided this 
theme into three subthemes: academic researchers, 
commercial funders (eg, a pharmaceutical company), 
and non­commercial funders (eg, a governmental 
agency).
Conflicts of interest related to academic researchers
One interviewee reported that surgeons with a strong 
belief in the beneicial efect of a procedure tampered 
with the randomisation process in a multicentre study. 
The interviewee explained: “What [several] centres 
did was open the envelopes in advance and gave the 
younger patients the new treatment and the older 
patients the old treatment” (interviewee 5).
Another interviewee, a biostatistician, experienced 
lead academic researchers asking for additional 
unplanned analyses or ways to present their data more 
positively to further their career. The interviewee said 
that the lead academic researchers made comments 
such as: “Well, if we want to get in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, which will make my career, then 
we got to have something to show” (interviewee 10).
In summary, the interviewees described a strong 
preference for one of the trial interventions by some 
researchers, and how the researchers might sub­
consciously or consciously try to manipulate a trial. 
The preferences might be linked to inancial conlicts 
of interests (eg, if the researcher had close ties to a 
trial funder) or non­inancial conlicts of interest (eg, 
if the researcher had a strong personal ailiation with 
a theoretical position or type of intervention). In both 
instances, these strong preferences might give rise to 
manipulations by diferent mechanisms, by cherry 
picking results from unplanned multiple analyses, or 
by not complying with the randomisation schedule so 
that patients with a good prognosis are selected for the 
experimental group.
Commercial inancial conflicts of interest
One interviewee described the inluence of pharma­
ceutical companies on which trials receive funding: 
“I actually think that the biggest place where conlicts 
come up . . . is in deciding which studies get done. I 
mean . . . once you have decided to do the trial the 
conlicts sort of become a side issue. But the much 
bigger issue is that there might be trials that I think 
we should do that industry doesn’t want to fund” 
(interviewee 7). The same interviewee relected on 
the interaction between trial design, pharmaceutical 
company, and regulatory authorities: “There is a 
big role that industry has in shaping what trials get 
done. And often in the United States, often those 
trials are driven by what the regulators, what the 
Food and Drug Administration, requires for approval” 
(interviewee 7).
Two interviewees said that pharmaceutical compa­
nies had tried to end the trials prematurely. According 
to one of the interviewees: “The trial was negative, and 
the company refused once they had an early look at 
the data, which they weren’t supposed to do . . . they 
basically stopped the support and follow­up, so we 
had an incomplete database and we actually had a lot 
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of trouble getting the database from them to report it” 
(interviewee 12).
One interviewee described how pharmaceutical 
companies inluenced follow­up analyses: “We 
often get supplemental contracts with industry to 
do secondary analyses of clinical trials . . . so, if the 
trial is positive and the drug is going to be approved, 
they will fund lots of secondary analyses . . . if the 
trial is negative they won’t” (interviewee 7). Another 
interviewee described a situation where an academic 
researcher, a specialist in the intervention tested in the 
trial, tried to spin (eg, overly favourable interpretation) 
the trial report. The trial found no efect of the 
intervention, and the researcher repeatedly suggested 
explanations for why the trial had failed to detect the 
efect of the intervention. The academic researcher 
eventually removed themselves from authorship on the 
paper after the other authors refused to agree to spin 
the trial report. The interviewee relected on the event: 
“Well, I think, because the research department from 
[their] institution received a lot of funding for training 
fees [from a company] . . . , a negative trial with [them] 
being one of the authors would be detrimental in terms 
of money” (interviewee 11).
In summary, the interviewees described how some 
drug and device company funders, or researchers with 
strong ties to a company, tried to manipulate a trial. 
Commercial inancial conlicts of interest might drive 
diferent manipulation mechanisms, such as shaping 
the research agenda of a specialty, using an inferior 
comparator, accessing preliminary trial results, 
not publishing negative results of interventions, 
performing multiple analyses of a positive trial, and 
spin of the trial results (table 2).
Non-commercial inancial conflicts of interest
One interviewee explained how representatives from 
governmental health departments, when negotiating 
a contract for a trial, wanted the option to prohibit 
papers from being published if they did not like the 
results: “We have done a few policy trials . . . We have 
had long and hard contract negotiations . . . where they 
felt they should be able to veto papers being published 
if they don’t like the results” (interviewee 10). Another 
interviewee said: “I mean, the whole conlict of interest 
issue has not dealt with the fact that the most powerful 
organisations in the world are governments, and when 
I say governments it’s the health part of it, and the 
health funding parts of it, and they have more conlicts 
of interest than others. With industry it’s transparent 
and you can set up mechanisms to deal with it, with 
governments they pretend they’re in for the public 
good, which they ought to be, but you know, people in 
governments make careers” (interviewee 17).
In summary, the interviewees described how some 
non­commercial funders will try to manipulate a trial. 
Non­commercial inancial conlicts of interest might 
result in manipulation by mechanisms also seen with 
commercial inancial conlicts of interest, such as not 
publishing negative results.
theme 2: management strategies for conflicts of 
interest
Multiple strategies were mentioned to manage con­
licts of interest in clinical trials. Table 3 reports a list 
of management strategies with illustrative quotes. 
Disclosure of conlicts of interest was mentioned by 
almost all interviewees as important for managing 
conlicts of interest in clinical trials. Making conlicts 
of interest transparent, and discussing the potential 
inluence of these interests, was the irst step to manage 
them for the trial collaborators. Conlicts of interest 
were disclosed at various times: when designing the 
trial, when preparing a grant application, once a year 
during the running of the trial, and when submitting 
the trial for publication.
One interviewee noted that at their institution, 
they carefully considered the value of the scientiic 
question in relation to the conlicts of interest before 
deciding whether to participate in a trial: “We really try 
to decide not to participate in trials that do not have 
any type of scientiic question or contribution that we 
think is important. I think that identifying clearly what 
is conlict, what’s the potential competing interest, 
then you can decide if your scientiic question is more 
important or not, and that’s in all’s interest. And we 
have refused participation in some trials that have 
table 1 | characteristics of the 20 interviewees
characteristics no of interviewees (%)
Educational background
 Physician 12 (60)
 Other healthcare profession 2 (10)
 Biostatistician 4 (20)
 Other professions 2 (10)
Sex
 Men 18 (90)
 Women 2 (10)
Location of primary institution
 Europe 9 (45)
 North America 7 (35)
 South America 1 (5)
 Africa 1 (5)
 Asia 1 (5)
 Oceania 1 (5)
Type of primary institution
 University 8 (40)
 Hospital 2 (10)
 University and hospital 6 (30)
 Private for-proit company 1 (5)
 Private not-for-proit organisation 3 (15)
Financial conflicts of interest of the interviewees*
 Yes 8 (40)
 No 12 (60)
Trial funding source experience†
 Industry funded with company involvement in trial 10 (50)
 Industry funded but independently run academic trials 19 (95)
 Non-commercially funded trials 18 (90)
Main type of trial the interviewees have participated in
 Drug trials 11 (55)
 Non-drug trials 6 (30)
 Similar proportion of drug trials and non-drug trials 3 (15)
Median (interquartile range) No of trials interviewees have participated in‡ 37.5 (20-100)
*Disclosed in the two most recent PubMed indexed trials.
†More than one category possible.
‡If a range was given, instead of an approximate number, the mean was used.
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been proposed that we clearly found there is only a 
inancial interest” (interviewee 9).
Some trials prohibited academic researchers with 
conlicts of interest; academic researchers were 
allowed to participate only if they had not received 
payments from companies that produced the drug 
under consideration or competitor drugs. Some of the 
interviewees had chosen not to receive any money 
from drug companies (eg, when sitting on advisory 
boards), and one of them said: “It allows me to speak 
freely. If I really think they’re coming up with a design 
that is suboptimal or biased, or otherwise one I am not 
comfortable with, I can easily say so” (interviewee 15).
In summary, the interviewees described the proce­
dures that were in place for handling conlicts of 
interest. Some type of procedure was in place in most 
trials, but practices difered greatly and focused mainly 
on commercial inancial conlicts of interest (table 3).
theme 3: deinition of conflicts of interest
Some interviewees described it as a challenge to 
distinguish a conlict of interest from related but 
distinct phenomena (eg, anticipation of an efect of an 
intervention) and from ignorance (eg, being unaware of 
the problems involved in selective reporting of results). 
One interviewee remarked: “Sometimes it is diicult 
to know why people do things. Sometimes it is just 
ignorance . . . they think they’re doing the right thing, 
but they’re not doing it because they want a particular 
treatment to win, they’re just doing it because they’re 
stupid. And then there are others who know what 
they’re doing, and they’re doing it to try and make sure 
the results favour their point of view” (interviewee 5).
Interviewees had diferent thresholds for what they 
considered to be conlicts of interest. Two interviewees 
described comparable situations where commercial 
funders stopped the trials early. One interviewee 
considered this action to be a result of conlicts of 
interest, although the other interviewee did not, and 
instead characterised the company’s decision to stop 
the trial as a “business decision” (which they did not 
consider a conlict of interest).
One interviewee said that they believed that many 
researchers have conlicts of interest: “I think it is true 
that most people are doing clinical trials or studying 
something for a reason. They typically believe it [the 
intervention] has an efect. They want to see whether 
or not that is actually true. So, I think the best way 
that we have come up with is to try and put in place 
design issues to minimise any potential subconscious 
inluence on results” (interviewee 14).
In summary, the interviewees described the dii­
culties in deining conlicts of interest, especially the 
vagueness of the concept of non­inancial conlicts 
table 2 | examples of how conflicts of interest might unduly influence diferent stages of clinical trials
stage of the trial and example of mechanism of influence Quotes
Design
Inferior comparator—the funder proposed comparing  
the intervention to a control treatment that was  
inferior to standard care
“For example, there are times where sponsors will propose comparing to an inferior control therapy, which 
may be approved for that indication, but it is no longer considered the standard care, no longer consider 
optimal” (interviewee 12)
Suboptimal primary outcome—the funder wanted to use an 
outcome that was easy to measure but was not directly  
clinically relevant
“The outcome that is selected may not necessarily be the outcome that I think should be the primary  
outcome, and a lot of times you don’t have much control. You can make a suggestion and they will say:  
‘no we’re going to do it this way’, and that’s it” (interviewee 20)
Choice of research agenda—pharmaceutical and device  
companies funded trials that potentially provide a  
positive result that they consider commercially interesting
“You know, the sponsors clearly have a result that they want to get . . . we work together to design trials that 
will answer the questions that they want to answer. They have a certain answer that they want. I have never 
felt pressured into getting that answer. But we only conduct trials that will potentially answer the questions 
that industry wants to answer” (interviewee 7)
conduct
Manipulation of the randomisation process—trial collaborators 
opened envelopes before the patients were enrolled
“What [several]*† centres did was open the envelopes in advance and gave the younger  
patients the new treatment and the older patients the old treatment” (interviewee 5)
Prematurely stopped the trial—the  
funder terminated a trial early
“They wanted to save money because they didn’t see the drug being a big seller  
and so they tried to shut the study down” (interviewee 17)
analysis
Blocking data access—the funders blocked the academic  
researchers’ access to the trial database
“The trial was prematurely terminated by the data safety monitoring board because of the drug  
actually was harmful and the company refused . . . to transfer the database to us.  
They basically blocked our access to the data” (interviewee 18)
Multiple unplanned analysis—the lead academic researcher 
wanted additional analyses to be conducted so that results 
would look more positive 
“I have had examples of . . . chief investigators who have kind of come back and asked for  
additional analysis or ways of presenting data that would make it look more positive then it was”  
(interviewee 10)
Fabrication of data—the lead academic researcher wanted to 
insert fabricated values in trial database
“The administrator . . . came to see me and said; ‘I have just been told by the chief investigator  
if there was a missing rating, I should just copy in the other rating’” (interviewee 10)
reporting
Spin—one of the academic researchers wanted to present the 
trial result in an overly positive way
“And then this researcher . . . [started] to make a lot of issues [as] to why we are writing the trial,  
so trying to ind excuses for not having positive results” (interviewee 11)
Premature release of results—the funder released interim  
data to stockholders prematurely
“The company deliberately broke the conidentiality of the study and actually released the interim data” 
(interviewee 18)
Prevention of publication—the funders did not want the  
academic researchers to publish the results because  
they were unfavourable to their product
“It was an approved drug that was harmful, compared to the comparator,  
where industry didn’t want us to publish the results” (interviewee 7)
Contractual constraints—the funder wanted contractual  
rights to prohibit a paper from being published
“We have done a few policy trials . . . we have had long and hard contract negotiations . . . where they felt 
they should be able to veto papers being published if they don’t like the results” (interviewee 10)
*The text is anonymised by deleting the speciic numbers of centres.
†Explanatory text inserted in brackets.
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of interest, the diference between risk of inluence 
and actual inluence because of a secondary interest, 
and the diiculties in deciding when a person with 
conlicts of interest acts because of these conlicts or 
for other reasons.
theme 4: reporting of conflicts of interest
Non­inancial conlicts of interest (intellectual conlicts 
of interest or ixated and strong personal beliefs) were 
considered harder to detect and therefore diicult 
to report. Commercial inancial conlicts of interest, 
on the other hand, were considered easier to detect 
because of the money low and hence easier to report. 
Reporting of inancial conlicts of interests was not 
always straightforward, however. One interviewee 
had participated in a trial funded by the World 
Health Organization where the funding was from a 
pharmaceutical company. Another interviewee had 
experienced a similar situation: “It raises interesting 
questions if you know some of the money is coming 
from somewhere else. Is that an additional conlict that 
you should report?” (interviewee 7).
Financial conlicts of interest in relation to non­
commercial funders, such as governmental health 
departments or charitable foundations, were con­
sidered diicult to detect by some interviewees. One 
table 3 | strategies for managing conflicts of interest in diferent stages of clinical trials
stage of the trial and example of strategy Quotes
Design
Declaration procedures*—suiciently  
declared conflicts of interest
“I would say, step one is disclosure of potential conflicts of interest at various stages during the trial.  
Sometimes early on, and sometimes relatively late . . . [during the course of]† the trial” (interviewee 16)
No direct payments—payments went to the research  
departments and not to the academic researchers
“In terms of compensation for participation in clinical trials, our hospital does not accept direct  
compensation for the investigator . . . So, the payment for clinical trials comes to the hospital usually,  
not directly to the investigators” (interviewee 9)
Preplanned methods—a detailed protocol  
(including data management plan and statistical analysis plan)
“[to manage conflicts of interest, it is good] to have a very good protocol for the trial, where people are in 
agreement on what is going to be conducted, and what is going to be the primary outcome or outcomes, and 
what is going to be the secondary and tertiary outcomes, and a good data plan for data management, and a 
good plan for statistical analysis, and a recording of the trial design in a paper as early as possible ater starting 
the trial, and a report of the statistical analysis plan before any data have been looked at” (interviewee 2)
Decline participation—academic researchers refused  
to participate in trials designed by the industry
“The way these trials are done is the company picks the steering committee, they pick a principal investigator, 
the company writes the protocol, the company analyses the data and the company provides data tables to the 
investigators . . . we will not participate in . . . such trials, we call them ‘rent-a-doc trials’” (interviewee 18)
Exclusion—trial collaborators with conflicts of interest  
were not allowed to contribute to designing the trial
“I think the best examples I have were in industry sponsored academically run trials, where the industry 
sponsor was . . . excluded from the design . . . , analysis and recording of the study. They funded it and they 
approved the general research questions, but they were not involved in anything further” (interviewee 16)
conduct
Adequate randomisation procedures—a web based system for 
randomisation minimises the risk of someone tampering with 
the randomisation
“Well, for randomisation we use a web-based system for all our trials” (interviewee 5)
Adequate blinding procedures—trial researchers were blinded 
and a plan of action described the procedure if blinding of the 
trial collaborators was broken
“The main way that we’re trying to address the potential influences of our intellectual conflicts . . . is just 
through design issues . . . ideally in almost all of our trials we blind” (interviewee 14) 
“We also make extensive efort to specify in our charters and executive committees etc, that blinding be  
maintained, to detail the few exclusions in which blinding may be broken, and also to isolate any personnel, 
who for whatever reason have their blinding broken” (interviewee 12)
Independent committees—independent data monitoring and 
trial steering committees are used to give unbiased  
recommendations
“If there is an independent committee that isn’t going to get its name on the paper anyway and isn’t going to 
have a better association with the pharma company if the trial is positive, and whose career ultimately doesn’t 
depend on the results, then that committee . . . is more likely to give an unbiased answer” (interviewee 15)
Exclusion—trial collaborators with conflicts of interest (strong 
belief in the efect of the experimental intervention) were 
excluded from also delivering the control intervention
“These guys [trial collaborators] are usually the treatment providers, so we try to ask them . . . not providing 
treatment for the control group . . . because the enthusiasm would be diferent” (interviewee 11)
analysis
Data access—a copy of the entire database was  
sent to the academic researcher
“Our contracts with the sponsor, the pharmaceutical company, usually state . . . that we will  
get a copy of the database” (interviewee 7)
Independent analysis—analysis was done by an  
independent academic statistician
“We’re going to give the data . . . to independent academics who have  
absolutely nothing to do with the trial” (interviewee 4)
Exclusion—trial collaborators with conflicts of interest were 
excluded from involvement in the analysis
“We cannot use tables that they [pharmaceutical company] provide, they  
[the tables] have to be done by our statisticians” (interviewee 18)
reporting
Transparency—detailed reporting if the  
protocol was not adhered to
“Sometimes you will do analyses that are not pre-speciied . . . you’ll just be honest  
about it and say it is not pre-speciied” (interviewee 17)
Exclusion—trial collaborators with conflicts of  
interest were excluded from manuscript writing
“We will not allow the company to write any portion of the manuscript, they can comment on  
the manuscript that we write, but they cannot write any portion of the manuscript” (interviewee 18) 
“The industry has the right to look at the drat of the manuscript and make any  
comments on areas of facts but not interpretation” (interviewee 5)
Authorship—a researcher with conflicts of interest  
was given a less important authorship position
“They [researchers with conflicts of interest] will be positioned in the middle  
of authorship rather than in top and tail” (interviewee 4)
Absence of contractual constraints on publication—the funders 
were not allowed to prohibit papers from being published
“I would also tend to pay quite a lot attention to contracts . . . whether they put any  
limitation on our ability to publish indings” (interviewee 10)
*Disclosure can be seen as a preventive step, as knowledge of the need to disclose conflicts of interest might prevent some researchers with strong conflicts of interest from participating in a 
trial, and if they participate, it might modify their behaviour or assessments when conflicts of interest are known. Also, disclosed conflicts of interest might influence the threshold for when the 
author group decides on an action to manage the conflicts of interest.
†Explanatory text inserted in brackets.
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interviewee said: “There has to be system in place to 
avoid competing interests at governments, at charitable 
foundations, at journals. It is not just an industry issue” 
(interviewee 17). Some of the interviewees mentioned 
variation in the standards for declaring conlicts of 
interest between scientiic journals. They also relected 
on the time period before conlicts of interest were 
regarded as outdated; three years for the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE),25 and 
four or ive years for some of the interviewees.
Most interviewees agreed that when reporting 
conlicts of interest, full details should be disclosed. 
One interviewee remarked: “I have generally taken 
the position that it is better to over­report. There are 
deinitely variations across journals, in terms of what 
they say is actually required. So, some will say: report 
any inancial relations you have had with any company 
in the last 2 years. I just reported any I have ever had at 
any time in my career” (interviewee 14).
In summary, the interviewees stated the importance 
of declaring all conlicts of interest, but also noted 
that declaration procedures difered and were focused 
mainly on commercial inancial conlicts of interest.
secondary analysis
We explored how men and women interviewees 
responded but found no diferences.
Discussion
Our study described how trial researchers perceive 
conlicts of interest unduly inluencing their trials 
and how they managed those conlicts of interests. 
Two more interview themes emerged: deinition and 
reporting of conlicts of interest. Examples of perceived 
undue inluence of conlicts of interest included 
the choice of comparator, manipulation of the 
randomisation process, prematurely stopping trials, 
fabrication of data, blocking access to data, and spin 
of trial results. Interviewees had many methodological 
strategies for managing conlicts of interest at diferent 
stages of their trials. They used diferent deinitions 
or thresholds for what they considered to be conlicts 
of interest, and some considered non­commercial 
inancial conlicts of interest (eg, funding of trials by 
governmental health agencies with an agenda) as 
equally or more important than commercial inancial 
conlicts of interest (eg, funding by drug and device 
companies), but more challenging to report and 
manage.
strengths and limitations of the study
A strength of our study was the use of qualitative 
interviews to study the inluence and management 
of conlicts of interest in clinical trials. This  design 
allowed us to explore trial researchers’ subtle relec­
tions on conlicts of interest in clinical trials with a 
focused analysis of their experiences based on their 
own trials. Trial researchers described their experiences 
of speciic mechanisms for how conlicts of interest 
had afected trials and which management strategies 
had been implemented to minimise the inluence of 
these conlicts. We included all experiences reported 
by the interviewees, regardless of when they occurred, 
to create a more detailed overview. Recent experiences 
might be remembered more clearly, and therefore were 
probably more commonly reported in our interviews.
Most of the interviewees (90%) were men. When 
we planned our study, we prioritised our sampling 
based on geography, professional background, 
and experience with diferent types of funders. The 
factors were selected based on our knowledge of trial 
methodology and conlicts of interest, and previous 
research.3 14­16 We acknowledge the gender bias in the 
career path to becoming an experienced trialist.26­28 
Our aim was not to look at gender bias in academic 
careers, however, but to explore how trialists reported 
their experiences and views on conlicts of interest 
in trials. We looked at how men (n=18) and women 
(n=2) interviewees responded to our questions but no 
diference was detected.
We sampled experienced trialists (deined as having 
participated in 10 or more trials), and the median 
number of trials the interviewees had participated 
in was 37.5. Including experienced trialists could 
have resulted in a conservative description of the 
problems involved because conlicts of interests might 
have more inluence on smaller trials conducted 
by less experienced trialists and with less eicient 
management practices in place.
Our qualitative investigation should not be 
interpreted in the same way as a quantitative study. 
Qualitative studies cannot establish how often the 
reported examples and events occur. Sampling 
of interviewees was based mainly on snowball 
suggestions from other interviewees and was not 
random or independent. The proportion of trial 
researchers that declined to participate or did not reply 
to our invitation was high (>60%). Trial researchers 
with repeated experiences of problems in their trials 
because of conlicts of interest are likely to more often 
decline participating in an interview study. Also, what 
constituted conlicts of interest, how problems were 
perceived, and how strong the links were between the 
two varied between interviewees. We noticed that some 
of the interviewees considered conlicts of interest to be 
present only if a clear inluence was apparent whereas 
other interviewees considered conlicts of interest as a 
set of circumstances that creates a risk of inluence.
Other studies
To our knowledge, no previous qualitative interview 
study has investigated how conlicts of interest 
might inluence clinical trials. Qualitative interview 
studies are rare in clinical trial methodology, but 
we were encouraged by a previous study describing 
trial researchers’ views on their motives for selective 
outcome reporting.29 Also, qualitative interview studies 
have investigated attitudes to universities’ policies on 
conlicts of interest (for clinical trials) and views on 
diferent strategies for handling conlicts of interest in 
clinical guidelines.30 31 In agreement with our results, 
a study reported that some content experts regarded 
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intellectual conlicts of interest as more important than 
inancial conlicts of interest.30
The results of our qualitative study complement 
previous case stories,8­10 theoretical considerations, 
systematic and narrative reviews,3 32 and meta­
epidemiological studies.33 Our results suggest mecha­
nisms that might explain the diferences between 
commercially and non­commercially funded trials 
that other studies have reported in relation to trial 
characteristics,34 results, and conclusions.3 33 Our study 
also emphasises the vagueness of the concept of non­
inancial conlicts of interest, and adds to the ongoing 
debate about the meaningfulness of the concept. 35 Our 
interviewees also had concerns about the role of non­
commercial inancial conlicts of interests in clinical 
trials. We could not identify any empirical study of the 
inluence of governmental or other non­commercial 
funders on trial design, conduct, analysis, or reporting.
Meaning of the study: possible explanations and 
implications for clinicians and policy makers
We found many examples of problems in clinical trials 
perceived to have arisen from conlicts of interest. We 
were surprised, however, that only eight of the 20 
interviewees reported that they had experienced what 
they considered as undue inluence. This inding could 
imply that in many trials conlicts of interest is not a 
problem. Another explanation could be related to the 
diferent thresholds researchers use to deine conlicts 
of interest, or problems, and when conlicts of interest 
are considered to cause a problem. The non­random 
selection process in recruiting the trial researchers 
could also explain this inding.
General concern exists among users of trial 
results that trial researchers’ conlicts of interest and 
commercial funding might unduly inluence trials.3 7 
In some trials, the funder’s inluence is considerable. 
One of the interviewees used the term “rent­a­doc trial” 
and explained that a pharmaceutical company picks 
the steering committee and a principal investigator, 
writes the protocol, analyses the data, and provides 
data tables to the investigators. Other mechanisms of 
inluence are use of inferior comparators, surrogate 
outcomes, limited access to data, and constraints on 
publication rights.36 37 Our study corroborates these 
indings and gives more examples, such as fabrication 
of data and spin of the results, in research publications.
We found that some of the interviewees regarded 
non­commercial inancial conlicts of interest as 
important. The reason could be that in the past decades, 
the primary focus of the debate on conlicts of interest 
in trials has been on the inluence of commercial 
drug and device companies.35 Financial conlicts of 
interest related to non­commercial funders, such as 
foundations or governmental agencies, has received 
little attention. We did note, however, that some of 
the interviewees had experienced that governmental 
health department funders, with a perceived policy 
agenda for a speciic trial result, had tried to impose 
restrictions on publication rights. The interviewees 
also relected on non­inancial conlicts of interest (eg, 
academic or specialty conlicts of interests). In general, 
these non­commercial conlicts of interest were 
regarded as more diicult to deine, report, detect, and 
handle.38
The interviewees described mechanisms where 
conlicts of interest unduly inluenced the design, 
conduct, analysis, and reporting of randomised trials. 
The mechanisms could be considered in three broad 
categories: applicability of a trial result, risk of bias 
in a published trial result, and missing trial results 
or spin of the results. An example of a mechanism 
related to the applicability of a trial result is choosing 
an inferior control group. Choosing an inferior control 
group is problematic for external validity39 and 
more generally for the relevance and completeness 
of the evidence within a specialty. An example of a 
mechanism related to the risk of bias of a trial result 
is tampering with randomisation envelopes which is 
problematic for internal validity.40 An example of a 
mechanism related to risk of bias because of missing 
trial results is not publishing the results of a trial or 
not publishing a speciic outcome of a trial because 
of “uninteresting” results. Missing uninteresting trial 
results will bias a meta­analysis (that would have 
included the trial results had they been available).41 
Also, incomplete reporting or spin of the results will 
reduce the transparency of the methods and results.42 
43 Thus the inluence of conlicts of interest on trials 
included efects on external validity, internal validity, 
and risk of non­reporting bias and spin.
We hope the results of our study will help 
interpretation of results from trials with conlicts of 
interest.44 Many of the examples of undue inluence 
from conlicts of interest that we found would not be 
described in a typical trial report. Our study supports 
the general awareness of potential problems in trials 
with conlicts of interests, however. A trial report 
might include suggestions of a conlict of interest, 
which could be interpreted more cautiously given our 
results. For example, a reader of a trial report funded 
by a non­commercial source investigating a politically 
sensitive issue could look more carefully for signs of 
undue inluence, and be more concerned about an 
unclear description of the funder’s role. A reader 
of trial reports might be more vigilant in assessing 
whether appropriate management strategies were in 
place to minimise possible undue inluence of conlicts 
of interest. We also hope that our results will further 
discussions on the policies of journals and funding 
agencies for managing and reporting conlicts of 
interest in trials, and inform the development of trial 
protocols.45
unanswered questions and future research
Our results are part of the evidence base for the 
development of a tool for looking at conlicts of 
interest in clinical trials.46 47 TACIT (tool for addressing 
conlicts of interest in trials) aims to guide readers of 
trial reports on where to access information on conlicts 
of interest and how to process the information. TACIT 
gives a structure for how to interpret results from trials 
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with conlicts of interest, especially when conducting 
a systematic review.47 Our results will inform the 
main framework components of TACIT: trial design, 
conduct, analysis and reporting. We can ofer the 
tool developers a range of problematic issues and 
mechanisms related to conlicts of interest, which the 
tool could aim to manage. A follow­up questionnaire on 
the frequency of the events and mechanisms reported 
by the interviewees could be useful, as would an in­
depth exploration of an academic’s legitimate interest 
in their research (including hopes for an efect of an 
intervention tested in a clinical trial) and non­inancial 
conlicts of interest. 
In conclusion, our study described how trial 
researchers perceive conlicts of interest having 
unduly inluenced clinical trials and the management 
strategies they used to prevent these inluences. 
We found considerable variability between trial 
researchers in their understanding of what are conlicts 
of interests and when they should be reported.
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